Negotiation and Persuasion - The Science and Art of Winning Cooperative Partners

2 Models of Negotiation and Effective Communication (p. 17-18)

2.1 Normative and Descriptive Theories

In the diverse field of negotiation there is no theory or general model that would cover the entire complexity of negotiation – not least because of the many different areas of application (Pruitt, 1998). Therefore, models or proposed methods generally concern relevant parts or aspects of the whole that have to be considered. Known theories can be divided into those that recommend or specify certain ways of thinking and behaving (normative or prescriptive models) and those that derive explanations and recommendations for negotiations from a description of conditions, modes of thought, and modes of behavior (descriptive models). The crux of normative theories is that no one knows whether or to what extent they are correct – even if they generally appear plausible; they are said to have content validity. With descriptive theories it is not certain whether they are still valid or how they work in general – since, although they are usually scientific, they were often tested in or derived from isolated or simplified conditions at some point in the past. Thomas (1992) lists six challenges that limit the generalizability and universal applicability of negotiation models, theories, and recommendations:

1. Models simplify the complexity of the reality or examine only certain variables.
2. The goals and perspectives considered in negotiations are very diverse.
3. Negotiations have different time-related variables and intensities.
4. Recommendations are generally not free of values but are shaped by ethical ideologies.
5. Negotiations are conducted by different people and groups.
6. Negotiations are subject to additional cultural influences.

Ultimately, the wish of a negotiation guide is that every behavior recommendation can also be based on sound scientific research, which then makes it justifiable. Of course, this wish can be met by scientific examination. Every research tradition and every type of modeling in relation to negotiation and its conditions have their justification. After all, every model delivers a framework and plausible uses, and perhaps new insights about the negotiating domain (Zartman, 2002). However, which type of model is best for personal use and application depends on the fundamental issues, the variables included in the model, the negotiation situation, the idiosyncrasies of those involved, and the subject of the negotiation.

To extend the differentiation made by Morley (2006), in the following chapter six different applications and research traditions are briefly described in a clear manner. The first three examine a more normative or prescriptive approach, while the last three are more descriptive models. There are also those described here. Causal models, for example, identify specifics of the situation, the process, and the potential result in descriptive terms. Structural models focus on steps and phases in the negotiating process in a normative sense (Carnevale, 2000).

2.2 Mathematical Microeconomic Approach: The Analytical Model

Analytical models are normative models based on game theory. In games (= negotiation, usually called bidding games), the negotiation variables that lead to an optimum result for both parties are determined (Gimpel, 2007). An analytical model assumes that the negotiation proceeds rationally and follows certain decision-making algorithms. In addition, the models assume that the negotiating parties want to maximize their benefits.

In other words, in these zero-sum situations the negotiation generally concerns the distribution of something, such as a price. Because of the distribution situation, these negotiations are also called distributive – as opposed to integrative situations in which the tendency is to expand the framework within a problem solution. The overlap of the bargaining zone of the negotiatiors in a distributive situation determines whether there is a mutually beneficial solution. Bazerman and Neale (1992) coined the term zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) for the bargaining zone (see Figure 2). In the figure it is clear that there is a zone of possible agreement only if the possible target areas of the participants overlap. This is the case if the buyer’s walkaway or bottom line price is higher than that of the seller. This price is often referred to as reservation price of the buyer.

In the first example in the figure, the bargaining zone is relatively large, in the second example on the same scale, it is slightly smaller. If, for example, a buyer does not want to spend more than $6,000 and a seller wants at least $9,000 for the same item (example 3), there is no overlap and, according to this approach, also no bargaining zone.