Cyberspace Mimic Defense - Generalized Robust Control and Endogenous Security

Preface

Author’s Profile

Brief Introduction (Abstract)

Preface

Acknowledgments

Contents

Abbreviations

Part I

Chapter 1: Security Risks from Vulnerabilities and Backdoors

1.1 Harmfulness of Vulnerabilities and Backdoors

1.1.1 Related Concepts

1.1.2 Basic Topics of Research

1.1.2.1 Accurate Definition of Vulnerability

1.1.2.2 Reasonable Classification of Vulnerabilities

1.1.2.3 Unpredictability of Vulnerabilities

1.1.2.4 Elimination of Vulnerabilities

1.1.3 Threats and Impacts

1.1.3.1 Broad Security Threats

1.2 Inevitability of Vulnerabilities and Backdoors

1.2.1 Unavoidable Vulnerabilities and Backdoors

1.2.1.1 The Contradiction Between Complexity and Verifiability

1.2.1.2 Challenges in Supply Chain Management

1.2.1.3 Inadequacy of Current Theories and Engineering Techniques

1.2.2 Contingency of Vulnerability Emergence

1.2.2.1 Contingent Time of Discovery

1.2.2.2 Contingent Form of Emergence

1.2.3 The Temporal and Spatial Characteristic of Cognition

1.2.3.1 From Quantitative Changes to Qualitative Changes

1.2.3.2 Absolute and Relative Interdependence and Conversion

1.2.3.3 The Unity of Specificity and Generality

1.3 The Challenge of Defense Against Vulnerabilities and Backdoors

1.3.1 Major Channels for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Attacks

1.3.2 Uncertain Unknown Threats

1.3.3 Limited Effect of Traditional “Containment and Repair”

1.3.3.1 Reduce the Introduction of Vulnerabilities into Software Development, but Oversights Are Inevitable

1.3.3.2 Discovering Vulnerabilities in the Testing Phase, but New Ones Are Emerging

1.3.3.3 Exploit Mitigation Measures Keep Improving, but the Confrontation Never Stops

1.3.3.4 The Careful Designing of White List Detection Mechanisms for System Protection Fails to Prevent Bypassing from Taking Place from Time to Time

1.4 Inspirations and Reflection

1.4.1 Building a System Based on “Contamination”

1.4.2 From Component Credibility to Structure Security

1.4.3 From Reducing Exploitability to Destroying Accessibility

1.4.4 Transforming the Problematic Scenarios

References

Chapter 2: Formal Description of Cyber Attacks

2.1 Formal Description Methods of Conventional Cyber Attacks

2.1.1 Attack Tree

2.1.2 Attack Graph

2.1.3 Analysis of Several Attack Models

2.2 The AS Theory

2.2.1 The AS Model

2.2.2 Defects in the AS Theory

2.3 The MAS

2.3.1 Definition and Nature of the MAS

2.3.2 MAS Implementation Methods

2.3.3 Limitations of the MAS

2.4 New Methods of Formal Description of Cyber Attacks

2.4.1 Cyber Attack Process

2.4.2 Formal Description of the Attack Graph

2.4.3 Formal Description of an Attack Chain

2.4.4 Vulnerability Analysis of Cyber Attack Chains

2.4.4.1 Conditions for the Successful Implementation of Atomic Attacks

2.4.4.2 The Conditions on Which the Successfully Completed Attack Chain Depends

References

Chapter 3: Conventional Defense Technologies

3.1 Static Defense Technology

3.1.1 Overview of Static Defense Technology

3.1.2 Analysis of Static Defense Technology

3.1.2.1 Firewall Technology

3.1.2.2 Intrusion Detection Technology

3.1.2.3 Intrusion Prevention Technology

3.1.2.4 Vulnerability Scanning Technology

3.2 Honeypot

3.2.1 Network Intrusion and Malicious Code Detection

3.2.2 Capturing Samples of Malicious Codes

3.2.3 Tracking and Analysis of Security Threats

3.2.4 Extraction of Attack Features

3.2.5 Limitations of Honeypot

3.3 Collaborative Defense

3.3.1 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Detection and Firewall

3.3.2 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Prevention and Firewall Systems

3.3.3 Collaborative Defense Between the Intrusion Prevention System and Intrusion Detection System

3.3.4 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Prevention and Vulnerability Scanning Systems

3.3.5 Collaborative Defense Between the Intrusion Prevention System and Honeypot

3.4 Intrusion Tolerance Technology

3.4.1 Technical Principles of Intrusion Tolerance

3.4.1.1 Theoretical Model

3.4.1.2 Mechanisms and Strategies

3.4.2 Two Typical Intrusion Tolerance Systems

3.4.2.1 Scalable Intrusion-Tolerant Architecture

3.4.2.2 Malicious and Accidental Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications [75]

3.4.3 Comparison of Web Intrusion Tolerance Architectures (Table 3.1)

3.4.4 Differences Between Intrusion Tolerance and Fault Tolerance

3.5 Sandbox Acting as an Isolation Defense

3.5.1 Overview of Sandbox

3.5.2 Theoretical Principles of Sandbox

3.5.2.1 Application Layer Sandbox

3.5.2.2 Kernel Layer Sandbox

3.5.2.3 Hybrid Sandbox

3.5.3 Status Quo of Sandbox Defense Technology

3.6 Computer Immune Technology

3.6.1 Overview of Immune Technology

3.6.2 Artificial Immune System Status

3.7 Review of Conventional Defense Methods

References

Chapter 4: New Approaches to Cyber Defense

4.1 New Developments in Cyber Defense Technologies

4.2 Trusted Computing

4.2.1 Basic Thinking Behind Trusted Computing

4.2.2 Technological Approaches of Trusted Computing

4.2.2.1 Root of Trust

4.2.2.2 Trust Measurement Model and Chain of Trust

4.2.2.3 Trusted Computing Platform (TCP)

4.2.3 New Developments in Trusted Computing

4.2.3.1 Trusted Computing 3.0

4.2.3.2 Trusted Cloud

4.2.3.3 SGX Architecture

4.3 Tailored Trustworthy Spaces

4.3.1 Preconditions

4.3.1.1 Communication

4.3.1.2 Computing

4.3.1.3 Security

4.3.1.4 Summary

4.3.2 Tailored Trustworthy Spaces (TTS)

4.3.2.1 Features Research

4.3.2.2 Trust Negotiation

4.3.2.3 Set of Operations

4.3.2.4 Privacy

4.4 Mobile Target Defense

4.4.1 MTD Mechanism

4.4.1.1 Randomization

4.4.1.2 Diversification Mechanism

4.4.1.3 Dynamic Mechanism

4.4.1.4 Symbiotic Mechanism

4.4.2 Roadmap and Challenges of MTD

4.5 Blockchain

4.5.1 Basic Concept

4.5.2 Core Technologies

4.5.3 Analysis of Blockchain Security

4.6 Zero Trust Security Model

4.6.1 Basic Concept

4.6.2 Forrrester’s Zero Trust Security Framework

4.6.3 Google’s Solution

4.6.3.1 Principles of Identifying Security Devices

4.6.3.2 Principles for Identifying Users’ Security

4.6.3.3 Removing Trust from the Network

4.6.3.4 Externalizing Applications and Workflows

4.6.3.5 Implementing Inventory-Based Access Control

4.7 Reflections on New Cyber Defense Technologies

References

Chapter 5: Analysis on Diversity, Randomness, and Dynameicity

5.1 Diversity

5.1.1 Overview

5.1.2 Diversity of the Executors

5.1.2.1 Executor Diversity in Network Operating Systems

5.1.2.2 Executor Diversity in the Path

5.1.3 Diversity of the Execution Space

5.1.3.1 Execution Space Diversity in Network Operating Systems

5.1.3.2 Execution Space Diversity in the Path

5.1.4 Differences Between Diversity and Pluralism

5.2 Randomness

5.2.1 Overview

5.2.2 Address Space Randomization

5.2.3 Instruction System Randomization

5.2.4 Kernel Data Randomization

5.2.5 Cost of Introduction

5.2.5.1 Different Software and Hardware Versions Require Different Expert Teams to Design and Maintain

5.2.5.2 The Cost Will Inevitably Increase if a Multi-version Service System Is Constructed

5.2.5.3 Introduction of Diversity Makes Multi-version Synchronized Updating a New Challenge

5.3 Dynamicity

5.3.1 Overview

5.3.1.1 Resource Redundancy Configuration

5.3.1.2 Cost of Randomness

5.3.1.3 Cost of Effectiveness

5.3.2 Dynamic Defense Technology

5.3.2.1 Dynamic Network

5.3.2.2 Dynamic Platform

5.3.2.3 Dynamic Software

5.3.2.4 Dynamic Data

5.3.3 Dynamicity Challenges

5.4 Case of OS Diversity Analysis

5.4.1 Statistical Analysis Data Based on the NVD

5.4.2 Common OS Vulnerabilities

5.4.3 Conclusions

5.5 Chapter Summary

References

Chapter 6: Revelation of the Heterogeneous Redundancy Architecture

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Addressing the Challenge of Uncertain Failures

6.2.1 Proposal of the Problem

6.2.2 Enlightenment from TRA

6.2.3 Formal Description of TRA

6.3 The Role of Redundancy and Heterogeneous Redundancy

6.3.1 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

6.3.2 Endogenous Functions and Structural Effects

6.3.3 Redundancy and Situational Awareness

6.3.4 From Isomorphism to Heterogeneity

6.3.4.1 Isomorphic Redundancy

6.3.4.2 Heterogeneous Redundancy

6.3.4.3 Appropriate Functional Intersections

6.3.5 Relationship Between Fault Tolerance and Intrusion Tolerance

6.4 Voting and Ruling

6.4.1 Majority Voting and Consensus Mechanism

6.4.2 Multimode Ruling

6.5 Dissimilar Redundancy Structure

6.5.1 Analysis of the Intrusion Tolerance Properties of the DRS

6.5.2 Summary of the Endogenous Security Effects of the DRS

6.5.3 Hierarchical Effect of Heterogeneous Redundancy

6.5.4 Systematic Fingerprint and Tunnel-Through

6.5.5 Robust Control and General Uncertain Disturbances

6.6 Anti-attack Modeling

6.6.1 The GSPN Model

6.6.2 Anti-attack Considerations

6.6.3 Anti-attack Modeling

6.7 Anti-aggression Analysis

6.7.1 Anti-general Attack Analysis

6.7.1.1 Non-redundant System

6.7.1.2 Dissimilar Redundant System

6.7.2 Anti-special Attack Analysis

6.7.2.1 Non-redundant System

6.7.2.2 Dissimilar Redundant System

6.7.3 Summary of the Anti-attack Analysis

6.8 Conclusion

6.8.1 Conditional Awareness of Uncertain Threats

6.8.2 New Connotations of General Robust Control

6.8.3 DRS Intrusion Tolerance Defect

6.8.4 DRS Transformation Proposals

References

Chapter 7: DHR Architecture

7.1 Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundant Architecture

7.1.1 Basic Principles of DHRA

7.1.1.1 Assumed Conditions

7.1.1.2 Composition and Functions

7.1.1.3 Core Mechanism

7.1.1.4 Robust Control and Problem Avoidance

7.1.1.5 Iterative Convergence

7.1.2 Goals and Effects of DHR

7.1.2.1 Killing Four Birds with One Stone

7.1.2.2 Dynamic Variability of the Apparent Structure

7.1.2.3 Equivalent to TRA with the Superposed-State Authentication Function

7.1.2.4 Metastable Scenarios and DRS Isomorphism

7.1.2.5 The Uncertainty Attribute

7.1.2.6 Coding Theory and Security Measurement

7.1.2.7 Endogenous Security Mechanism and Integrated Defense

7.1.2.8 Problem Avoidance and Problem Zeroing

7.1.3 Typical DHR Architecture

7.1.4 Atypical DHR Architecture

7.2 The Attack Surface of DHR

7.3 Functionality and Effectiveness

7.3.1 Creating a Cognition Dilemma for the Target Object

7.3.2 DFI to Present Uncertainty

7.3.3 Making It Difficult to Exploit the Loopholes of the Target Object

7.3.4 Increasing the Uncertainty for an Attack Chain

7.3.5 Increasing the Difficulty for MR Escape

7.3.6 Independent Security Gain

7.3.7 Strong Correlation Between the Vulnerability Value and the Environment

7.3.8 Making It Difficult to Create a Multi-target Attack Sequence

7.3.9 Measurable Generalized Dynamization

7.3.10 Weakening the Impact of Homologous Backdoors

7.4 Reflections on the Issues Concerned

7.4.1 Addressing Uncertain Threats with Endogenous Mechanisms

7.4.2 Reliability and Credibility Guaranteed by the Structural Gain

7.4.3 New Security-Trustable Methods and Approaches

7.4.4 Creating a New Demand in a Diversified Market

7.4.5 The Problem of Super Escape and Information Leaking

7.5 Uncertainty: An Influencing Factor

7.5.1 DHR Endogenous Factors

7.5.2 DHR-Introduced Factors

7.5.3 DHR-Combined Factors

7.5.4 Challenges to a Forced Breakthrough

7.6 Analogical Analysis Based on the Coding Theory

7.6.1 Coding Theory and Turbo Codes

7.6.2 Analogic Analysis Based on Turbo Encoding

7.6.2.1 Coding Heterogeneity

7.6.2.2 Coding Redundancy

7.6.2.3 Coding OV

7.6.2.4 Decoding and Ruling

7.6.2.5 Codec Dynamics

7.6.3 Some Insights

7.6.3.1 Randomness and Redundancy Serving as the Core Elements for Solving Cyberspace Security Problems

7.6.3.2 Uncertainty Effect Brought by DHRA

7.6.3.3 Flexibility and Self-restoring Capability of DHRA

7.6.3.4 Insufficiency in Analogical Analysis Using the Turbo Code Model

7.7 DHR-Related Effects

7.7.1 Ability to Perceive Unidentified Threats

7.7.2 Distributed Environmental Effect

7.7.3 Integrated Effect

7.7.4 Architecture-Determined Safety

7.7.5 Changing the Attack and Defense Game Rules in Cyberspace

7.7.6 Creating a Loose Ecological Environment

7.7.6.1 “Isomeric and Diversified” Ecology

7.7.6.2 New Ways to Accelerate Product Maturity

7.7.6.3 Self-controllable Complementary Form

7.7.6.4 Creating an Integrated Operating Environment

7.7.7 Restricted Application

7.7.7.1 Micro-synchronous Low-Time-Delay Operating Environment

7.7.7.2 Time-Delay-Constrained Scenarios That Cannot Be Corrected

7.7.7.3 Lack of a Normalizable Input/Output Interface

7.7.7.4 Lack of Heterogeneous Hardware/Software Resources

7.7.7.5 “Blackout” in Software Update

7.7.7.6 Cost-Sensitive Area

7.7.7.7 Concerns Regarding the Highly Robust Software Architecture

7.7.7.8 Issue of Ruling

References

Part II

Chapter 8: Original Meaning and Vision of Mimic Defense

8.1 Mimic Disguise and Mimic Defense

8.1.1 Biological Mimicry

8.1.2 Mimic Disguise

8.1.3 Two Basic Security Problems and Two Severe Challenges

8.1.4 An Entry Point: The Vulnerability of an Attack Chain

8.1.5 Build the Mimic Defense

8.1.6 Original Meaning of Mimic Defense

8.2 Mimic Computing and Endogenous Security

8.2.1 The Plight of HPC Power Consumption

8.2.2 Original Purpose of Mimic Calculation

8.2.3 Vision of Mimic Calculation

8.2.4 Variable Structure Calculation and Endogenous Security

8.3 Vision of Mimic Defense

8.3.1 Reversing the Easy-to-Attack and Hard-to-Defend Status

8.3.2 A Universal Structure and Mechanism

8.3.3 Separation of Robust Control and Service Functions

8.3.4 Unknown Threat Perception

8.3.5 A Diversified Eco-environment

8.3.6 Achievement of Multi-dimensional Goals

8.3.7 Reduce the Complexity of Security Maintenance

References

Chapter 9: The Principle of Cyberspace Mimic Defense

9.1 Overview

9.1.1 Core Ideology

9.1.2 Eradicating the Root Cause for Cyber Security Problems

9.1.3 Biological Immunity and Endogenous Security

9.1.3.1 Non-specific Immunity

9.1.3.2 Specific Immunity

9.1.3.3 Non-prior-Knowledge-Reliant Defense

9.1.3.4 Endogenous Security

9.1.4 Non-specific Surface Defense

9.1.5 Integrated Defense

9.1.6 GRC and the Mimic Structure

9.1.7 Goals and Expectations

9.1.7.1 Development Goals

9.1.7.2 Technical Expectations

9.1.8 Potential Application Targets

9.2 Cyberspace Mimic Defense

9.2.1 Underlying Theories and Basic Principles

9.2.1.1 FE Common Sense and the TRA

9.2.1.2 DHR Architecture

9.2.1.3 Security Effects Brought About by Endogenous Mechanisms

9.2.2 Mimic Defense System

9.2.2.1 The Main Concepts and Core Mechanisms of CMD

9.2.2.2 CMD Model

9.2.3 Basic Features and Core Processes

9.2.4 Connotation and Extension Technologies

9.2.4.1 Connotation Technologies

9.2.4.2 Extension Technologies

9.2.5 Summary and Induction

9.2.6 Discussions of the Related Issues

9.2.6.1 CMD Level Based on the Attack Effect

9.2.6.2 Measurement Based on Reliability Theories and Test Methods

9.2.6.3 Security Situation Monitoring of the Target System

9.2.6.4 Contrast Verification

9.2.6.5 Information Security Effect

9.2.6.6 Mimic Defense and Mimic Computation

9.2.6.7 Unknown Threat Detection Devices

9.2.6.8 “Halt-Restart” Bumps

9.2.6.9 Standby Cooperative Attacks and External Command Disturbances

9.2.6.10 Superimposable and Iterative

9.2.6.11 Granularity of the Target Object

9.2.6.12 Natural Scenarios of DHR

9.2.6.13 About the Side Channel Attack

9.3 Structural Representation and Mimic Scenarios

9.3.1 Uncertain Characterization of the Structure

9.3.2 Mimic Scenario Creation

9.3.3 Typical Mimic Scenarios

9.4 Mimic Display

9.4.1 Typical Modes of Mimic Display

9.4.2 Considerations of the MB Credibility

9.5 Anti-attack and Reliability Analysis

9.5.1 Overview

9.5.2 Anti-attack and Reliability Models

9.5.3 Anti-attack Analysis

9.5.3.1 Analysis of CMD’s Resistance Against the General DM/CM Attacks

9.5.3.2 Anti-special Attack Analysis of the CMD System

9.5.3.3 Summary of the Anti-attack Analysis

9.5.4 Reliability Analysis

9.5.5 Conclusion

9.6 Differences Between CMD and HIT (Heterogeneous Intrusion Tolerance)

9.6.1 Major Differences

9.6.2 Prerequisites and Functional Differences

9.6.3 Summary

References

Chapter 10: Engineering and Implementation of Mimic Defense

10.1 Basic Conditions and Constraints

10.1.1 Basic Conditions

10.1.2 Constraints

10.2 Main Realization Mechanisms

10.2.1 Structural Effect and Functional Convergence Mechanism

10.2.2 One-Way or Unidirectional Connection Mechanism

10.2.3 Policy and Schedule Mechanism

10.2.4 Mimic Ruling Mechanism

10.2.5 Negative Feedback Control Mechanism

10.2.6 Input Allocation and Adaptation Mechanism

10.2.7 Output Agency and Normalization Mechanism

10.2.8 Sharding/Fragmentation Mechanism

10.2.9 Randomization/Dynamization/Diversity Mechanism

10.2.10 Virtualization Mechanism

10.2.11 Iteration and Superposition Mechanism

10.2.12 Software Fault Tolerance Mechanism

10.2.13 Dissimilarity Mechanism

10.2.14 Reconfiguration Mechanism

10.2.15 Executor’s Cleaning and Recovery Mechanism

10.2.16 Diversified Compilation Mechanism

10.2.17 Mimic Structure Programming

10.3 Major Challenges to Engineering Implementation

10.3.1 Best Match of Function Intersection

10.3.2 Complexity of Multimode Ruling

10.3.3 Service Turbulence

10.3.4 The Use of Open Elements

10.3.5 Execution Efficiency of Mimic Software

10.3.6 Diversification of Application Programs

10.3.7 Mimic Defense Interface Configuration

10.3.7.1 Route Forwarding Based on Mimic Defense

10.3.7.2 Mimic Defense-Based Web Access Server

10.3.7.3 File Storage System Based on Mimic Defense

10.3.7.4 Mimic Defense-Based Domain Name Resolution

10.3.7.5 Mimic Defense-Based Gun Control System

10.3.8 Version Update

10.3.9 Loading of Non-cross-Platform Application

10.3.10 Re-synchronization and Environment Reconstruction

10.3.11 Simplifying Complexity of Heterogeneous Redundancy Realization

10.3.11.1 Commercial Obstacles to Heterogeneous Redundancy

10.3.11.2 Locking the Robustness of the Service

10.3.11.3 Achieving Layered Heterogeneous Redundancy

10.3.11.4 SGX and the Protection of Heterogeneous Redundant Code and Data

10.3.11.5 Avoiding the “Absolutely Trustworthy” Trap of SGX

10.4 Testing and Evaluation of Mimic Defense

10.4.1 Analysis of Mimic Defense Effects

10.4.1.1 Definitive Defense Effect Within the Interface

10.4.1.2 Uncertain Defense Effect on or Outside the Interface

10.4.1.3 Uncertain Defense Effect Against Front Door Problems

10.4.1.4 Uncertain Social Engineering Effects

10.4.2 Reference Perimeter of Mimic Defense Effects

10.4.2.1 Ideal Effects of Mimic Defense

10.4.2.2 Reference Range of Defense Effect

10.4.3 Factors to Be Considered in Mimic Defense Verification and Test

10.4.3.1 Background of Testing

10.4.3.2 Principles of Testing

10.4.3.3 Major Testing Indicators

10.4.3.4 Considerations of Test Methods

10.4.3.5 Qualitative Analysis of Defense Effectiveness

10.4.4 Reflections on Quasi-stealth Evaluation

10.4.5 Mimic Ruling-Based Measurable Review

10.4.6 Mimic Defense Benchmark Function Experiment

10.4.7 Attackers’ Perspective

10.4.7.1 Mining or Setting up Vulnerabilities/Backdoors in the Mimic Interface

10.4.7.2 Creating a Homologous Ecosystem with the Development Tools and the Open-Source Community Model

10.4.7.3 Black-Box Operations Using “Irreplaceable” Advantage

10.4.7.4 Developing Attack Codes that Are Not Dependent on the Environment

10.4.7.5 Coordinated Operation Under Non-cooperative Conditions Using Input Sequence

10.4.7.6 Trying to Bypass the Mimic Interface

10.4.7.7 Attacking the Mimic Control Aspect

10.4.7.8 DDoS Brute Force Attacks

10.4.7.9 Social Engineering-Based Attacks

10.4.7.10 Directly Cracking Access Command or Password

References

Chapter 11: Foundation and Cost of Mimic Defense

11.1 Foundation for Mimic Defense Realization

11.1.1 Era of Weak Correlation of Complexity to Cost

11.1.2 High Efficiency Computing and Heterogeneous Computing

11.1.3 Diversified Ecological Environment

11.1.4 Standardization and Open Architecture

11.1.5 Virtualization Technology

11.1.6 Reconfiguration and Reorganization

11.1.7 Distributed and Cloud Computing Service

11.1.8 Dynamic Scheduling

11.1.9 Feedback Control

11.1.10 Quasi-Trusted Computing

11.1.11 Robust Control

11.1.12 New Developments of System Structure Technologies

11.2 Analysis of Traditional Technology Compatibility

11.2.1 Naturally Accepting Traditional Security Technologies

11.2.2 Naturally Carrying Forward the Hardware Technological Advances

11.2.3 Strong Correlation to Software Technological Development

11.2.4 Depending on the Open and Plural Ecological Environment

11.3 Cost of Mimic Defense Implementation

11.3.1 Cost of Dynamicity

11.3.2 Cost of Heterogeneity

11.3.3 Cost of Redundancy

11.3.4 Cost of Cleanup and Reconfiguration

11.3.5 Cost of Virtualization

11.3.6 Cost of Synchronization

11.3.7 Cost of Ruling

11.3.7.1 Synchronous Judgment

11.3.7.2 Agreed Output

11.3.7.3 First Come, First Output

11.3.7.4 Regular Judgment

11.3.7.5 Mask Decision

11.3.7.6 Normalized Pretreatment

11.3.8 Cost of Input/Output Agency

11.3.9 Cost of One-Way Connection

11.4 Scientific and Technological Issues to Be Studied and Solved

11.4.1 Scientific Issues Needing Urgent Study in the CMD Field

11.4.2 Engineering and Technical Issues Needing Urgent Solution in the CMD Field

11.4.2.1 Dissimilarity Design and Screening Theory

11.4.2.2 Pluralistic and Diversified Engineering Issues

11.4.2.3 Assessing the Security Impact of the “Homologous” Component Vulnerability on the DHR Architecture

11.4.2.4 How to Establish a System Design Reference Model

11.4.2.5 How to Prevent Standby Attacks

11.4.2.6 Mimic Ruling

11.4.2.7 Protection of the Mimic Control

11.4.2.8 Mimic Structural Design Technology

11.4.2.9 Mimic Construction Implementation Technology

11.4.3 Defense Effect Test and Evaluation

11.4.4 Comprehensive Use of Defense Capability

11.4.5 Issues Needing Continuous Attention

11.4.6 Emphasizing the Natural and Inspired Solutions

References

Chapter 12: Examples of Mimic Defense Application

12.1 Mimic Router Verification System

12.1.1 Threat Design

12.1.2 Designing Idea

12.1.3 DHR-Based Router Mimic Defense Model

12.1.4 System Architecture Design

12.1.4.1 Overall Framework

12.1.4.2 Function Unit Design

12.1.5 Mimic Transformation of the Existing Network

12.1.6 Feasibility and Security Analysis

12.2 Network Storage Verification System

12.2.1 Overall Plan

12.2.2 Arbiter

12.2.3 Metadata Server Cluster

12.2.4 Distributed Data Server

12.2.5 The Client

12.2.6 System Security Test and Result Analysis

12.3 Mimic-Structured Web Server Verification System

12.3.1 Threat Analysis

12.3.2 Designing Idea

12.3.3 System Architecture Design

12.3.4 Functional Unit Design

12.3.4.1 Request Dispatching and Balancing (RDB) Module

12.3.4.2 Dissimilar Redundant Response Voter

12.3.4.3 Dynamically Executing Scheduler

12.3.4.4 Dissimilar Virtual Web Server Pool

12.3.4.5 Primary Controller

12.3.4.6 Database Instruction Labelling (DIL) Module

12.3.5 Prototype Design and Realization

12.3.6 Attack Difficulty Evaluation

12.3.7 Cost Analysis

12.4 Cloud Computing and Virtualization Mimic Construction

12.4.1 Basic Layers of Cloud Computing

12.4.2 Cloud Computing Architecture Layers

12.4.3 Virtualized DHR Construction

12.5 Application Consideration for Software Design

12.5.1 Effect of Randomly Invoking Mobile Attack Surface

12.5.2 Guard Against Hidden Security Threats from Third Parties

12.5.3 Typical Mimic Defense Effects

12.6 Commonality Induction of System-Level Applications

References

Chapter 13: Testing and Evaluation of the Mimic Defense Principle Verification System

13.1 Mimic Defense Principle Verification in the Router Environment

13.1.1 Design of Test Methods for Mimic-Structured Routers

13.1.2 Basic Router Function and Performance Test

13.1.2.1 Routing Protocol Functional Test

13.1.2.2 Forwarding Performance Comparison Test

13.1.3 Test of the Mimic Defense Mechanism and Result Analysis

13.1.3.1 Data Transformation Function Test

13.1.3.2 Data Stream Fingerprint Function Test

13.1.3.3 Protocol Executor Random Display Test

13.1.3.4 Protocol Executor Routing Abnormity Monitoring and Handling Test

13.1.3.5 Endogenous Flow Interception Test

13.1.4 Defense Effect Test and Result Analysis

13.1.4.1 Attack Models and Testing Scenarios

13.1.4.2 System Information Scanning Test

13.1.4.3 Mimic Interface Vulnerability Detection Test

13.1.4.4 Test of Difficulty in Vulnerability Exploitation Within Mimic Interface

13.1.4.5 Test of Difficulty in Utilizing Backdoors in the Mimic Interface

13.1.5 Test Summary of Mimic-Structured Router

13.2 Mimic Defense Principle Verification in the Web Server Environment

13.2.1 Design of Test Methods for Mimic-Structured Web Servers

13.2.1.1 Test Process Design

13.2.1.2 Test Environment Setting

13.2.2 Basic Functional Test and Compatibility Test for Web Servers

13.2.2.1 HTTP Protocol Function Test

13.2.2.2 Page Compatibility Comparison Test

13.2.3 Mimic Defense Mechanism Test and Result Analysis

13.2.4 Defense Effect Test and Result Analysis

13.2.4.1 Scanning Detection Test

13.2.4.2 Operating System Security Test

13.2.4.3 Data Security Test

13.2.4.4 Anti-Trojan Test

13.2.4.5 Web Application Attack Test

13.2.5 Web Server Performance Test

13.2.5.1 Benchmark Web Server Performance Testing

13.2.5.2 DIL Module Performance Test

13.2.5.3 System Overall Performance Test

13.2.6 Summary of the Web Principle Verification System Test

13.3 Test Conclusions and Prospects

References

Chapter 14: Application Demonstration and Current Network Testing of Mimic Defense

14.1 Overview

14.2 Application Demonstration of the Mimic-Structured Router

14.2.1 Status Quo of the Pilot Network

14.2.1.1 Threat Analysis

14.2.1.2 Application Scenario

14.2.1.3 Product Plan

14.2.1.4 Application Deployment

14.2.1.5 Cost Analysis

14.2.1.6 Application Outcome

14.2.2 Current Network Testing

14.2.2.1 Testing Purpose

14.2.2.2 Testing Plan

14.2.2.3 Testing and Evaluation Items

14.2.2.4 Current Network Testing

14.2.2.5 Testing and Evaluation

14.3 Mimic-Structured Web Server

14.3.1 Application Demonstration

14.3.1.1 Application of the Mimic-Structured Web Server (MSWS) in a Financial Enterprise

14.3.1.2 Application of the MSWS on a Government Website

14.3.1.3 Application of the Mimic-Structured Web Virtual Host (MSWVH) in Gianet Fast Cloud (GFC)

14.3.2 Current Network Testing

14.3.2.1 Testing of the MSWS

14.3.2.2 Testing of the MSWVH

14.4 Mimic-Structured Domain Name Server (MSDN Server)

14.4.1 Application Demonstration

14.4.1.1 Threat Analysis

14.4.1.2 Application Scenario

14.4.1.3 Product Plan

14.4.1.4 Application Deployment

14.4.1.5 Cost Analysis

14.4.1.6 Application Effect

14.4.2 Testing and Evaluation

14.4.2.1 CUHN

14.4.2.2 Gianet

14.5 Conclusions and Prospects