Introduction

INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH EDITION

When the fifth edition of this brief and handy history was introduced in 2009, South‐East Asia, like nearly all the rest of the world, was struggling with contagious recession. The region emerged from that and has generally resumed growth. In the biggest economy, Indonesia, there is a fair chance of broad expansion and in a couple of the smaller states there is clear improvement. Political uncertainties constrain investment and growth in some places.

But the most striking change since 2009 is the large and rapid increase in the salience of China's presence and influence. This is evident in new regional institutions, in trade, and in infrastructure funding and in an assertive claim of sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. That claim has been given physical shape by the development of reefs and islands, some newly and artificially formed, on some of which air strips or other military facilities are being installed. Despite a decision by an arbitration tribunal operating under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea against China's claims, regional governments have been relatively careful in their criticism of China's claims. Whether the United States, which has also disputed China's claims, will continue to do so under a Trump Administration remains to be seen. President‐elect Trump's remarks during the campaign might suggest a reduction in US engagement in the region.

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2009 FIFTH EDITION

The first sentence of my introduction to the fourth edition has been reinforced by the market since then. More than 150,000 copies of “this little book” have now been sold and here we are with a fifth edition. That it fills a need is more than ever obvious. Busy people who need a basic history of one or more of the countries of South‐East Asia have been well‐served by it.

The region, like the rest of the world in January 2009, faces formidable difficulties. Demand for exports is drying up, as is foreign investment. Economies that have a major exposure to earnings sent home by workers who have jobs in other countries are likely to be adversely affected. For example, some eight million Filipinos work overseas and their repatriated earnings are a significant part of the country's national income. The competence of governments every‐ where will be tested. Some will manage better than others, but all will come under strain. A major question is whether regional cooperation will be more effective than in 1987–88. Their histories do not enable us to predict with certainty how South‐East Asian countries will be affected. But some knowledge of history certainly helps.

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2006 FOURTH EDITION

The continuing and increasing demand for this little book reflects not only the quality of its contents and the relevance of its format but also the prominence of South‐East Asia in events which have engaged worldwide attention. Thus Islam in South‐East Asia has been much discussed and many outside the region have become aware that there are more adherents of that religion in Indonesia than in any other country in the world. Political changes and developments in Indonesia, with a new and very different president, have appeared to hold out new promise, as has the change of leadership in Malaysia. Security incidents and concern about threatening networks have prompted unprecedented cooperation between the countries of the region including Australia. Most recently the natural disaster of the tsunami wave originating off Sumatra has focused world attention on the region and brought a huge supportive international response.

The East Asian solidarity movement, based on ASEAN, Japan, China and Korea, is still in an early stage, with difficulties between Japan and China, and reservations in ASEAN about both the giant northern neighbours, seeming likely to complicate prospects. But South‐East Asia continues to seek to shape this regional cooperation by, for example, insisting that candidates sign on to its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea found ways of doing so without prejudice to their alliance arrangements with the United States, and the government of Australia appears to be considering doing so. Economically, South‐East Asia is far from demonstrating the dynamism of China and indeed China's growth increasingly raises questions of the effects on the region. The flood of China's low‐priced products is damaging South‐East Asian exports to major existing markets, especially since the textiles regime changed. But some Chinese industries are investing in production facilities in South‐East Asia and Chinese demand for raw materials and energy resources is benefiting some parts of the region. In any case, the rise of China seems certain to be a major influence on the region in the years ahead. The countries of the region, and especially perhaps Indonesia and the Philippines, will need to address present constraints on their economic performance in order to hold their own.

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2003 THIRD EDITION

The success of this book shows that it fills a need, both in Australia and beyond, and that there is continuing interest in learning about the countries of South‐East Asia. That is encouraging because there have been major changes in the region since the book was first produced. Those changes probably require qualification of the optimistic last paragraph of the introduction I wrote three years ago. I will try to say briefly why that is so.

In the first place the global climate is more uncertain and even threatening. It is a commonplace that the early post–Cold War euphoria has dissipated. The Western alliance system is divided and possibly even endangered; the enthusiasm for international economic liberalisation has diminished; fear of terrorism has had a major effect, especially on the only superpower; and there is an historically high level of resentment and friction in the global system.

Secondly, South‐East Asia has experienced some of the effects of the heightened intensity of Islamic anger spilling out of the Israel/Palestine issue, the slow economic development of the Arab world, and various perceived grievances, especially against the United States. Some countries in the region have taken firm action to prevent violent expressions of that anger, including in the form of international terrorism. Others have been less effective. Domestic religious violence, in some places on a large scale, has also been costly.

Thirdly, recovery from the financial crisis has been patchy and slower than expected. Necessary action on failed banking and financial institutions in Indonesia, for example, is still awaited. Reform and improvement of governance and legal institutions have not been much in evidence.

Fourthly, the dynamism of the Chinese economy and particu‐ larly the growth of its exports have overshadowed South‐East Asia. Foreign investment has flowed strongly to China while appearing more wary of some of the old favourites in South‐East Asia.

Indeed all the last three factors have no doubt played a role in the reduction in FDI into the region in recent years.

South‐East Asia has also experienced a diminution of the growth of regional solidarity. This is hard to quantify, but the authority and standing of ASEAN and of its associated FTA seem to have slipped.

If confronted by an external challenge ASEAN would no doubt show renewed solidarity and resilience. But there has been a loss of momentum. This may be partly because the region seems to be waiting to see what comes out of China. Will China emerge in the next ten or 15 years as a new superpower, and if so will it inevitably expand its zone of influence? Will it then become the dominant power in an ASEAN plus Three configuration, a realisation of Dr Mahathir's EAEC concept but with China, and not ASEAN or Japan, as the main driver?

Finally, without wishing to sound a parochial note, something needs to be said briefly about the position of Australia. The Australian perspective has become more reserved, at least at the government level, and the strenuous enforcement of “border protection” measures, as well as confusion about an Australian “deputy sheriff” role and preparedness to undertake “pre‐emptive” action to stop emerging threats, have been among the factors seen in the region as evidence of a shift in Australian attitudes away from the “engagement” policy of the previous years. To some extent that perception overlooks the fact that the Australian engagement policy suffered a series of rebuffs by the region which would have made it difficult for any government to maintain. It also needs to be taken into account that Australian public opinion (to which government is highly responsive) was inevitably affected by the extensive and graphic media coverage of events in East Timor. That coverage was far more intensive in Australia, largely because of proximity, than anywhere else in the region.

The biggest challenge for Australia is to combine realistic...